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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of trade and domestic agricultural policy reforms 
on the distribution of incomes in six developing countries: Brazil, China, India, Malawi, 
Mexico and South Africa. The aggregate results from a global trade model are fed into 
separate national models. The insights available from alternative model types are evaluated. 
The distributional impacts of reform are found to be complex and to vary between countries. 
Given that it is typically impossible to reform (or equally not reform) without hurting some 
households with lower incomes, the conclusion is that it makes sense to help these households 
with targeted policies. 
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This paper synthesises a number of specific contributions. The GTAPEM input was provided by Hsin Huang and Frank van 
Tongeren at OECD. The China and India analyses were done by Dirk Bezemer. The Brazil and South Africa studies were 
undertaken by Scott McDonald. In the case of the Brazil, the analysis draws on a Social Accounting Matrix developed by 
Carlos R. Azzoni, Tatiane A. Menezes, Fernando G. Silveira, Eduardo A. Haddad, Joaquim M. Guilhoto and Heron C. E. 
Carmo. The Malawi work was undertaken by Andrew Dorward, Colin Poulton, Hardwick Tchale and Peter Wobst; while the 
Mexico study was provided by Ed Taylor, George Dyer and Antonio Yúnez. The contributions for Brazil, Malawi and 
Mexico were provided for an OECD project entitled “The Global, National and Household Level Effects of Trade and 
Agricultural Policy Reforms” (OECD, 2006a). In addition, the analyses for Brazil, China and South Africa each provided 
stand-alone input into recently published reviews of agricultural policies in these countries (OECD, 2005a; OECD, 2005b, 




The fundamental rationale for multilateral trade reform is that, by inducing a more efficient 
allocation of resources among and within countries, it should raise global welfare and, 
concomitantly, the individual welfare of most countries. Yet global trade reforms remain 
contentious, partly because there will inevitably be some losers, at least in the short term. At 
the national level, some net importers of food could see their import bills rise as a 
consequence of reduced agricultural support and protection worldwide. Likewise, countries 
benefiting from trade preferences for their exports could see the value of those preferences 
eroded by global tariff reductions. Moreover, within countries that stand to benefit, there is 
typically expected to be a losing constituency, notably households remunerated by import-
competing sectors that formerly benefited from protection. 
In the case of developing countries, there are particular concerns about the effect of reforms 
on the incidence of absolute poverty and the distribution of income. Even if reform is 
expected to be on balance poverty-reducing, it is still likely that some poor households will 
face income losses. The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) arose from a recognition that 
trade reform cannot proceed on the basis of a laissez-faire approach to poverty, distributional 
and broader development impacts in developing countries. Both the DDA and the Millennium 
Development Goals, which include a commitment to halve poverty by 2015, seek to reconcile 
economic development with the promotion of a more open, rules-based trading system. 
This paper examines the links between trade reform and income distribution in a sample of 
developing countries and so seeks to inform the DDA discussions. The analysis draws on a 
range of work undertaken by and for the OECD. The starting point is OECD’s measurement 
of the global and aggregate national impacts of multilateral reform, obtained from GTAPEM, 
a modified version of GTAP, a multi-sector and multi-region computable general equilibrium 
model widely used for trade policy analysis.
1  The results of this analysis are used 
exogenously in six national studies, which each trace the aggregate impacts of reform down to 
the micro (household) level. 
The six countries for which specific applications are developed are Brazil, China, India, 
Malawi, Mexico and South Africa. The sample of countries is naturally too small to provide a 
                                                 
1.  GTAP refers to the Global Trade Analysis Project. GTAPEM is the name given to the modified 
version of the GTAP model that draws on the OECD’s Policy Evaluation Model (PEM). 
 
 
87  e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 86-111, 2006 
 
complete picture of distributional impacts in developing countries. However, the countries 
collectively account for a large share of the world’s poor. They are also heterogeneous in 
terms of both per capita income level (Brazil and Mexico are upper middle income countries, 
whereas Malawi is among the world’s poorest), and economic structure (including both net 
food importers and net exporters). Accordingly, the studies illustrate a number of the diverse 
effects that policymakers need to bear in mind when considering the distributional effects of 
reform. The approach of tracking down the macro impacts of reform to the micro level is 
similar in nature to that adopted in another major research project, undertaken by the World 
Bank (Hertel and Winters, 2005a). The broad policy insights are comparable, although 
methodological differences among the individual case studies make for distinct policy 
insights. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the method of analysis, including 
the policy reform scenario, the way in which results from GTAPEM are passed through to the 
country models, and the specifics of each national study. Section 3 provides a brief summary 
of the aggregate results from GTAPEM, while section 4 examines how those aggregate 
impacts are distributed in each of the six country studies. Section 5 provides a discussion of 
the results, draws some analytical lessons and suggests some conclusions for policymakers. 
2. Method 
The global and national effects of multilateral trade reforms and reforms to domestic farm 
programmes are calculated using GTAPEM. In GTAPEM, the standard GTAP model is 
adapted to provide a more realistic representation of the structure of the agricultural sector 
(notably in the allocation of land between alternative uses), and to accommodate a 
representation of policy interventions that is accurate and consistent with the way in which 
support is classified and measured by the OECD. In addition, the data used in this analysis 
take account of the trade preference schemes operated by a number of countries.
2
The national models each take country-specific results from a GTAPEM liberalisation and 
reform experiment, and introduce these as exogenous changes. The appropriate method of 
doing this varies according to the characteristics of the national model. Each model is 
constructed somewhat differently, according to the economic characteristics of the country, 
data availability, and the authors’ judgements on the appropriate methodology. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
2.   For further details on the model, the reader is referred to OECD (2006a). 
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each traces the implications of a common set of trade reforms and farm subsidy cuts through 
to the micro (household) level. There are three main methodological approaches. The Brazil 
and South Africa studies each embed representative household groups in a CGE model. The 
Malawi and Mexico studies start with models of farm household behaviour (which admit the 
possibility of market failures), and then specify further economy-wide linkages. In these four 
studies, changes in export and import prices are taken exogenously from GTAPEM, with all 
other changes determined endogenously in the national model. The China and India studies 
take changes to prices and quantities on output and input markets from GTAPEM, allocate 
these changes across households, and calculate changes to each surveyed household’s 
revenues, expenditures and net income. The absence of a common template means that 
comparisons of the results across all six countries can only be made loosely. On the other 
hand, each approach has its strengths and weaknesses, in terms of the effects it can capture 
and the insight that it offers, and the contrasting methodologies offer some valuable analytical 
lessons. The household disaggegations and methodologies are summarised below. 
CGE models with embedded households 
 
The Brazil and South Africa studies each embed stratified household types, which account for the 
totality of households, in a CGE model. In the case of Brazil, there are 10  household accounts, 
comprising four categories of family farm (non-commercial) household, ordered by economic size; 
one category of “commercial” farm households; one category of wage-earning agricultural employees; 
and four categories of urban household, ordered by income quartile. For South Africa, households are 
ordered by region (six), racial group (White, Coloured or Asian, Africa) and education (low, medium 
and high, with a separate category for African farmers). 
The CGE models all follow a standard form in which households groups have demand functions that 
enable them to respond to reforms by varying their consumption decisions, while production responses 
are determined at the market level and passed through to the household via changes in factor incomes. 
A benefit of this approach is that each study provides substantial sectoral detail. In the case of Brazil 
study there are 30 activities, of which 9 are in primary agriculture and 15 are in agribusiness; and 40 
products, of which 17 are agricultural and 19 of the remaining 23 are agribusiness or strongly 
agriculture related. In the South africa study, there are 47 sectors, including 19 agricultural accounts 
and 10 food accounts, plus several agriculture-related activities both upstream and downstream from 
the farmgate. 
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The Malawi and Mexico studies start with models of farm household behaviour which, unlike 
the CGEs, account for the possibility that farmers may face market failures in product and/or 
factor markets. These applications further specify a range of market interactions beyond the 
household level, but fall short of fully embedding farm household models within a national 
CGE. 
In the case of Malawi, seven types of farm household are nested in a model of the rural 
economy. Households are differentiated first with respect to three agro-ecological zones and 
second with regard to socio-economic characteristics within each zone. The latter 
characteristics include off-farm employment income, remittances, value of assets, retained 
maize stocks, holding size, access to credit and gender of household head. These data were 
used to define seven household “types”: larger farmers, medium sized farmers with assets, 
borrowers, poor male headed households, poor female headed households, employees and 
remittance earners. The model allows each household “type” to behave differently, depending 
on the resource constraints that it faces.  
The Malawi study is based on analysis with a farm household level model, calibrated with 
mathematical programming methods. The approach recognizes explicitly market failures on 
both labour and product markets and the resulting interdependence of households’ decisions 
on production, consumption and labour supply. The Malawi model also takes account of 
seasonal constraints, varied activities among households and heterogeneity in resource 
endowments. By allowing for different maize prices in the harvest and post-harvest periods, 
the model allows for some embedded risk. Farm households are nested in a model of the rural 
economy, whereby households interact with each other and with “external” markets for output 
(maize and tobacco) and wage labour. The model of the rural economy is in turn loosely 
nested in a national CGE model of Malawi’s economy. 
The Mexico case study estimates four separate farm household models for each of Mexico’s 
five census regions (i.e. 20 models in total), and these household models are embedded in a 
separate CGE for each region. The household types are: (1)  commercial farms on large 
landholdings, which behave more like firms than like households; (2) net-surplus producing 
family farms on medium and small holdings, typical of small owner-operated farms of 
medium productivity; (3)  subsistence and infra-subsistence household farms, typical of 
small-scale, low productivity agriculture, frequently operating under marginal conditions and 
incomplete markets; and (4) landless rural households. 
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For each of five regions, there are four farm households nested within a rural CGE. The 
household models are estimated separately, to capture the fact that the same household 
category does not look the same in all regions. The CGE model determines the (net) marketed 
surplus of tradable commodities as the difference between supply and demand. Prices for 
‘village’ tradables are exogenous, determined by markets outside the village or by policy. 
Prices of village non tradables (land and hired labour) are endogenous, with local supply 
equal to demand, and individual household price takers. For households that do not participate 
in local markets, prices are unobserved shadow prices, and the marketed surplus is zero. 
 
Microsimulation with behavioural responses taken from GTAPEM 
 
For China and India, information on prices and quantity changes in both output and input 
markets is used to calculate changes in each household’s costs and revenues (the income side) 
and consumption expenditures. The procedure, which is modified from McCulloch (2003), is 
applicable to data sets with household-level information on production and consumption. 
The Chinese data originate from a November-December 2000 rural household survey among 
1 200 households, covering 4 387 people, in 60 townships in six Chinese provinces across the 
country: Hebei, Hubei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Zhejiang. In the household survey, 
information was collected on a range of productive activities, consumption, household 
members' demographic situation, labour market status, and land use. A parallel village survey 
collected information on size, infrastructure, agricultural potential, labour flows, access to 
utilities as well as other information concerning the villages in the sample. Data on both 
consumption and production were available for a subset comprising slightly less than half the 
total sample (Chang, 2004). 
In the case of India, the analysis makes use of rural household survey data from Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh, two relatively poor and rural states situated in the north and northwest of India, 
respectively. The data are from a 1998 rural household survey covering 2 252 households and 
14 493 people - in 134 villages spread out over 25 districts in Bihar and UP. Data from 1 550 
of these households was collected on a range of productive activities and consumption 
patterns.  The data also include socio-economic variables such as caste, education, 
demographic situation, labour market status and land use. As for China, a parallel village 
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survey collected information on variables such as village size, infrastructure, agricultural 
potential, household labour flows and household access to utilities. 
For each observation the change in household income is calculated in the neighbourhood of 
its assumed optimum, given endowments. Changes in the prices and quantities of output 
(most household are agricultural producers), factors (including wages) and consumption 
goods are taken from the GTAPEM analysis. Thus, both first and second order effects of 
policy reform are incorporated in the analysis. Rising (falling) producer prices and higher 
(lower) wages increase (decrease) producers’ incomes, while rising (falling) prices increase 
(decrease) the cost of a household’s consumption bundle. The total welfare effect, for each 
household, is the sum of the consumption and production effects. 
3. Aggregate impacts of reform 
GTAPEM is used to simulate the effects of a 50% reduction in tariffs for all countries and all 
sectors, a 50% cut in agricultural export subsidies for all countries, and a 50% reduction in 
domestic farm support in OECD countries. The results are comparative static and are based 
on data for 2001. Accordingly, recent policy changes, including the US farm bill and the 
introduction of the single farm payment in the European Union, are not considered. Policy 
changes as a result of China’s WTO accession are also excluded, with the exception of tariff 
reductions made on grains and oilseeds. 
The global impacts of these reforms are described in detail in OECD (2005a), along with the 
vectors of policy changes that are fed into the national models. The main results are reported 
briefly here, in order to situate the sources of welfare gains and losses for the six case country 
studies, first with respect to the overall impacts on developing countries, and second relative 
to the global impacts (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Decomposition of welfare effects by broad policy category, region and country 















World  44 268  0.1  23 361  3 124  6 694  11 357 
  OECD  33 459  0.1  21 407  1 871  -248  10 680 
  Non-OECD  10 809  0.2  1 954  1 253  6 943  677 
            
  Brazil  1 730  0.3  1 178  94  367  96 
  China  3 739  0.3  -73  -199  3 373  635 
  India  1 723  0.4  72  544  378  735 
  Malawi  24 1.4  19  -1  1  6 
  Mexico  452 0.1  38  -30  463  -15 
  South Africa  253 0.2  69  25  23  137 
Note: Agriculture includes primary and processed food. 
Source: GTAPEM simulation results. 
 
At the global level, more than half the total gains from the global reform package described 
previously come from reforms to agricultural policies in OECD countries. The vast majority 
of the benefits from these particular reforms accrue to OECD countries themselves, largely 
because they inflict less harm on themselves than before. For non-OECD developing 
countries as a whole, tariff cuts on manufactures are the most important source of gains, 
although significant benefits also flow from agricultural reforms in both OECD and non-
OECD countries. None of the six country case studies conforms exactly to this pattern, which 
underscores the danger of extrapolating the average result to individual countries, or even 
groups of countries. 
In the case of Brazil, agricultural reforms account for about two-thirds of the country’s total 
welfare gain of USD  1.7  billion. Most of these benefits derive from agricultural policy 
reforms in OECD countries, notably in the European Union, which accounts for about 40% of 
Brazil’s agricultural exports. Indeed, Brazil obtains more than half of all the gains to 
developing countries resulting from agricultural reforms in OECD countries. The benefits 
deriving from reforms in the manufacturing sector are much less important in relative terms 
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(just 27% of the total gains), with most of the USD 460 million gain coming from reforms in 
OECD countries. In this case, the efficiency gains to Brazil from lowering its own tariffs on 
manufactures are to a large extent offset by rising import prices. 
In the case of China, most of the benefits come from lower tariffs on manufactures in OECD 
countries. These benefits account for almost one-half of all the gains to developing countries 
stemming from reforms to non-agricultural policies in OECD countries. The results suggest a 
small net welfare loss from agricultural policy reforms, in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries (including China itself), with the net benefit from higher world market prices for 
agricultural goods (e.g.  accruing to those producing exportable agricultural commodities) 
marginally outweighed by the higher cost of agricultural imports facing some consumers. 
For India, the biggest gains come from non-OECD reforms to the manufactures sector, with 
reforms by India itself especially important. India levies relatively high tariffs on imported 
manufactures, and a substantial share of the benefits are expected to come from a reduction in 
these tariffs. With respect to agriculture, the share of trade to total production is low for both 
exports and imports (about 4%), which goes a long way in explaining the modest gains 
relative to the size of the sector. 
For Malawi, the gains derive mostly from reforms to OECD country agricultural products 
(lower tariffs on the product category including tobacco).
3 Mexico benefits significantly from 
OECD country non-agricultural policy reforms, and slightly from changes to OECD country 
agricultural policies. However, it loses from non-OECD country reforms to both agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors as a result of adverse movements in the terms of trade. South 
Africa gains from all categories of reform. The biggest source of benefits is non-OECD 
country tariff cuts on manufactures (including South Africa’s own tariffs), but there are also 
significant gains from reduced agricultural support and protection in OECD countries. In each 
case, the benefits are driven by improvements in allocative efficiency, which are partially 
offset by terms of trade losses. 
 
                                                 
3.   Malawi’s principle agricultural export is tobacco, which is included among “other crops” in GTAP. 
Given Malawi’s weak integration with world markets for food crops and other products, cash crops 
are the most important source of impact, but the results should nevertheless be treated with caution. 
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4. Distributional impacts by country 
Brazil 
 
The aggregate welfare gains from reform vary from USD 1.5 billion with full employment to 
USD 2.2 billion under the more realistic assumption of unemployed unskilled labour. (These 
two estimates bridge Brazil’s estimated national welfare gain of USD 1.7 billion obtained in 
the GTAPEM simulation.) These impacts are ultimately distributed across households, via 
changes in factor returns. Figure 1 shows the changes in welfare for each household group 
under alternative closure rules. 
In general, the welfare gains are widespread across household types. With the poorer 
categories of both urban and rural household better off, the incidence of poverty falls. At the 
same time, inequality among agricultural producer households increases, with larger (and 
richer) family farm households gaining more than smaller ones. This is because larger farms 
tend to be more specialised in export products, for which price increases are relatively large. 
On the other hand, the total gains to agricultural employees are more than for any other type 
of agricultural household. The benefits to this group derive from the increased demand for 
farm labour from commercial farm households. Because agricultural employees are relatively 
poor, this impact counteracts the increase in inequality among agricultural producers. Urban 
households also gain, and their benefits generally increase with income level. For these 
households, the benefits attributable to increased redistributed profits and wage earnings from 
the agro-food sector outweigh the costs of food price increases. An exception is the richest 
quartile, which gains less than the second richest group, and in fact loses when there is full 
employment (because they end up paying more for goods that use unskilled labour). The tax 
burden, while assumed to remain constant globally is shared among the household types 
differently following reform. Higher tax costs fall disproportionately on the third urban 
quartile. This reflects a relatively flat income tax structure for the richest 50% of urban 
households and greater cost of living increases for the second richest group. 
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Figure 1. Distributional effects of global policy reform in Brazil - Equivalent Variation  






















urban 1 urban 2 urban 3 urban 4
full employment full employment / fiscal neutrality unemployment unemployment / fiscal neutrality
 
Source: McDonald (2005a). 
Given that the above categories contain different numbers of households and persons, further 
insight can be obtained from the annual changes in welfare per ‘person’ that are reported in 
Figure 2. These estimates confirm that, for agricultural households, the welfare gains increase 
with income, and that the benefits to agricultural households are generally greater than for 
urban households.
4
                                                 
4.  The number of members per household tends to decline as income increases. Hence the tendency for 
richer individuals to gain more than poorer ones (in both rural and urban categories) is more 
pronounced than the tendency for richer households to benefit more than poorer households. 
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urban 1 urban 2 urban 3 urban 4
full employment full employment / fiscal neutrality unemployment unemployment / fiscal neutrality
 
Source: McDonald (2005a). 
In overall terms, real incomes are expected to rise by between 2% and 4% for agricultural 
producers, by around 3% for agricultural employees, and by about 1% for urban households. 
These income gains lead to a modest decline in the incidence of poverty. Because commercial 
farmers gain more than smallholders, inequality among producers is expected to increase. But 
the wider gains to agricultural employees and urban households (who account for about 80% 





In China, global reforms provide an average welfare gain of 2.8%, varying between 2.2% in 
Shaanxi and 4.0% in Hubei province (Table  2). This welfare impact is the sum of 
                                                 
5.   For further details on these results the reader is referred to OECD (2005a). In particular, these model 
results are situated relative to actual changes in household incomes and inequality through the 1990s, 
an evaluation that underscores the importance of not confusing the specific impacts of trade reform 
with the more general impacts of structural change. 
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consumption and income effects. On average, the former is close to zero because of offsetting 
price changes resulting from GTAPEM. In contrast, the income effects are positive, due to 
increases in both the revenues from the goods and factors the households sell, and the wages 
that they earn. 
Only 9% of the sample households experience welfare losses. While the share of households 
gaining increases continuously over consumption levels, poor households gain significantly 
more in relative terms than non-poor households, with an average welfare increase of 4.6%, 
compared to 2.6% for non-poor households. This is due almost exclusively to the income 
effect; the tiny consumption effect tends to increase inequality only slightly. 
Table 2. Proportional welfare effects of price changes 





=a+b  (%) 
% of households 
gaining 
Total 0.0  2.8  2.8  91 
...by province         
Hebei  0.2 2.7  2.9  93 
Hubei 0.1  4.0  4.0  96 
Liaoning 0.1  2.4  2.5  89 
Shaanxi 0.0  2.2  2.2  90 
Sichuan -0.3  2.7  2.4  87 
Zhejiang 0.0  3.3  3.3  89 
...by poverty status         
Non-Poor 0.0  2.5  2.6  91 
Poor -0.2  4.8  4.6  89 
…by quintile         
1
st quintile (poorest)  -0.2  4.6  4.5  89 
2
nd quintile  -0.1  3.8  3.7  88 
3
rd quintile  0.1  2.6  2.7  90 
4
th quintile  0.1  2.3  2.3  90 
5
th quintile (richest)  0.1  1.4  1.5  95 
Source: Survey data and OECD Secretariat’s calculations. 
The survey data were used to construct a profile of the 9% of households who do not gain 
from reforms. Compared to households who do gain, these are found to live in communities 
which on average are smaller (1 160 compared to 1 220 inhabitants); have less arable land 
(one third less); live further from the nearest paved road (1.4 compared to 1.2 km) and from 
the nearest town (30 km compared to 25 km); and are less mobile, with fewer emigrants and 
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immigrant per 1  000 population (19% and 25% less, respectively). This suggests that 
households in communities poorly endowed with agricultural potential, infrastructure and 




The average welfare increase for India is, at 0.84%, much smaller than for China. This is 
despite GTAPEM results suggesting that the aggregate welfare gains for India are, as a 
percentage of GDP, slightly greater than for China. The most likely reason is that the Indian 
analysis focuses on two relatively poor rural states. Two-thirds of sample households gain 
from reform, implying more losers than in the case of China. 
The consumption effect is small, at only a fifth of a per cent of present household incomes. 
This can be explained by small and mutually offsetting exogenous price changes coming from 
GTAPEM. Relatively speaking, the largest consumption effects occur in non-food 
consumption, where prices decline on average. This is partially counteracted by price 
increases for most food products. 
The income effect accounts for two-thirds of the total welfare gain across households. The 
most important income source is household agricultural production, and includes the balance 
of costs and revenues for a number of agricultural products. There are many offsetting effects, 
with rice revenue increasing, but the average revenue across other crops declining. The net 
income effect for agriculture is a gain of just over 1% of household consumption expenditures. 
This is partly offset by a negative income effect on own non-farm enterprises, as a result of 
revenue decreases for both manufactures and services and a slight decline in the wages of 
unskilled labour in the non-agricultural sector. 
These aggregate figures hide considerable geographical and distributional variation. Fewer 
households in Bihar experience welfare decreases than in Uttar Pradesh, even though the 
former state is poorer (Table 3). 
                                                 
6.   For further analysis of these results, see OECD (2005b). 
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Table 3. Welfare effects and beneficiaries: differences by state 






% households who gain
Bihar 0.86  0.33  1.19  76 
UP 0.51  0.12  0.62  58 
Whole sample  0.64  0.20  0.84  65 
Sources: Survey data, GTAPEM output and author’s calculations. 
The two states have similar income structures, as disaggregated by the six income categories. 
The difference in income effects must therefore be due to within-category differences, with 
the two states employing different types of unskilled labour and having different agricultural 
production structures. Similarly, the differences in consumption effects cannot be attributed to 
a simple difference in the relative importance of food and non-food expenditures. Households 
in Bihar consume significantly more rice and less wheat - which shields them more from the 
comparatively large increase in the consumption price of wheat. Similarly, a higher demand 
for meat enhances the welfare benefits of a large decrease in meat prices. These results 
underline the importance of having detailed information on consumption and income 
structures. 
From a policy perspective, such heterogeneity implies that using simple disaggregations such 
as large income categories or the food share in total consumption may yield misleading results. 
Detailed information on consumption bundles and income structures is needed to develop 
more robust and nuanced predictions of the welfare impacts of price reforms. 
The results are broken down by per capita consumption quintile in Table 4. The bottom two 
quintiles correspond approximately to those households falling below the official poverty line. 
The simulated price reforms are on balance pro-poor, but they raise inequality. The reason for 
this is that  poor households have negative consumption effects, while there are only small 
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Gaining from reform 
(%) 
Poorest 1  900  0.66  -0.30  0.36  47 
2 2  666  0.75  0.01  0.76  64 
3 3  444  0.59  0.16  0.75  69 
4 4  591  0.70  0.44  1.14  73 
Richest 7  569  0.54  0.58  1.12  71 
Whole sample  4 197  0.64  0.20  0.84  65 
Source: Bezemer (2005). 
The negative consumption effect on poor households reflects their different consumption 
basket. In particular, poor households spent close to a fifth of their income on staples (rice and 
wheat), which have large price increases. This contrasts with a budget share of one-tenth for 
the richest quintile. An implication of this finding is that while non-agricultural policy 
reforms are the most important source of aggregate benefits for India, agricultural reforms are 
the biggest determinant of poverty and distributional outcomes. Given that the results are 
based on a sample survey of households from two of India’s poorest states, they can be seen 




The vast majority of Malawian households are poor. Commercial producers of the dominant 
cash crop, tobacco, who are less poor, gain from higher prices. GTAPEM suggests price 
increases of less than 5% for the principal cash crop (tobacco) from a 50% global reform 
scenario, which will raise tobacco farmers’ incomes by less than 1%. The resulting increase in 
tobacco farmers’ demand for labour benefits poor non-commercial households who cannot 
grow tobacco, but lowers the incomes of poor farm households that hire in labour. The 
simulations suggest it is actually the poorest households (farm wage-earners) who gain most 
from tobacco price increases. In contrast, the domestic price of maize, the main staple, may be 
only weakly linked to international market prices. Moreover, the effects of maize price 
increases/decreases are very context specific, depending on the range over which price 
increases occur, whether the household has a net surplus or deficit, and the relationship 
between maize prices, wages and fertiliser prices. 
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The effects of policy reforms in Malawi depend fundamentally on the extent of interactions 
that are considered, and the original values for which the model is calibrated. Under the 
simplest farm household model (with no outside market interactions), all households lose 
from increases in maize prices from a very low base where all households are net buyers of 
maize. At higher prices, however, some households gain and some lose from price increases, 
depending on whether they are, or have the scope to become, net sellers. Poorer households 
lose because cash and land constraints prevent them moving to a profitable net surplus. In this 
case, higher maize prices can actually induce a perverse supply response. This occurs because 
an increase in the maize price raises the cost of food expenditures, which tightens the cash 
constraint, reducing households’ ability to buy inputs with which to grow maize, and, for the 
poorest households, requiring them to allocate labour from maize production to wage 
employment which delivers immediate (if lower) income. Similarly, increases in wages can 
cause these households to supply less labour to the market. In the case of tobacco, the benefits 
of higher prices accrue to larger smallholder farms, owners of more assets, borrowers, 
non-agricultural wage earners and remittance earners. The poorest households do not benefit, 
as they do not grow the crop due to lack of cash to buy inputs. 
But even a relatively limited extension to the basic household model to accommodate wage 
changes can fundamentally alter (and in some cases reverse) estimates of how the poor will be 
affected by policy reform. In response to small increases in maize prices, wages fall, but with 
larger maize price increases wages rise, with the extent of the response depending on changes 
in on-farm labour use, total labour supply, and the demand for non-tradable goods and 
services (and hence for non-farm labour used in their production). Very low maize prices lead 
to larger areas under tobacco which requires more farm labour than maize. As maize prices 
rise, real incomes fall (increasing total labour supply, and decreasing demand for non-tradable 
goods and services), and farm labour is also released by the transfer of land from tobacco to 
maize. Larger maize price rises lead to less poor households finding it worthwhile to become 
surplus maize producers, so their incomes begin to rise again (reducing their family labour 
supply and increasing demand for labour to produce non-tradables). They also begin to adopt 
more intensive maize technologies, which demand more on-farm labour. This tightening of 
the labour market leads to increased wages, which may offset some of the losses to the 
poorest households which lose from higher maize prices. 
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The introduction of inter-sectoral and international linkages, together with dynamics, further 
complicates the results. For example, higher international maize prices can stimulate 
technological change and drive up productivity, which then serves to drive down domestic 
prices. Higher international tobacco prices also induce competing effects on maize prices. On 
the one hand, higher tobacco earnings lead farmers to switch crops, the reduction in maize 
supply tending to raise prices. On the other hand, higher tobacco prices improve the balance 
of payments, strengthen the currency and effectively lower the prices of imported maize. 
Mexico 
Feeding in results from the GTAPEM reform scenario, estimated real incomes of all 
agricultural households fall, but the declines are greatest for producers with more than 5 ha of 
land (-0.4%). There are similar, but much smaller impacts for landless households and smaller 
producers with less than 5 ha (-0.1%). There are two principal reasons why larger farmers 
lose more: first, they tend to consume a smaller share of their own output, so declining output 
prices have a bigger impact on net cash income; second, larger scale producers on balance 
rent land out to smaller farmers and lose out from declining land rents. The results are 
summarised in Table 5. These average impacts for Mexico mask regional differences that are 
potentially important in the case of smaller, non-commercial farm households. 
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Table 5. Percentage effects of price shocks resulting from multilateral trade reform 









Maize  0.15 0.20 0.24 1.22 
Cash  crops  -1.14 -0.28 -0.28 -0.30 
Livestock  -0.14  0.01 -0.13 -0.14 
Nonag  0.63 0.48 0.13 0.44 
Factors 
Wages, urban  -0.20 
Wages, rural  -0.26 
Land rents  -1.01 
Prices      
Maize  -0.60 -0.57 -0.52 -0.40 
Cash crops  -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 
Livestock  -0.70 -0.70 -0.70 -0.70 
Incomes      
Nominal  -0.16 -0.24 -0.22 -0.33 
Real  -0.13 -0.15 -0.13 -0.40 
Migration      
Domestic 0.002 
International 0.03 
Exogenous changes, taken from GTAPEM simulations, are in bold. 
Source: Taylor and Yunez (2005). 
A series of stylised experiments were performed for each regional to consider these effects. 
These experiments show, for example, that commercial farm households lose most from 
lower prices for both maize and cash crops, while the impacts on smaller farm households 
(less than five hectares) differ significantly from one region to the next.
7 In the North-West, a 
10% decrease in the maize price lowers maize production by all household types, with the 
result that the real incomes of small farm households, after offsetting wage and land rent 
reductions, fall by up to 2%. In Central Mexico, on the other hand, a lack of integration with 
commercial maize markets means that small farmers do not suffer from these price reductions; 
but they still pay less in land rents, with the result that their incomes rise fractionally. In the 
                                                 
7.  In the case study, a 10% increase in prices is simulated, so the results are the inverse of those reported 
here. However, since simulated policy effects can safely be assumed to be symmetrical, the 
presentation of results here was turned around to maintain consistency with the way findings are 
reported for the other studies. 
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case of a 10% cash crop price decrease, production falls moderately across all household 
groups in Central Mexico, lowering commercial farm households’ income by 4%, but small 
farm households’ income by less than half as much, due to lower land rents. On the other 
hand, the same price change causes commercial production to fall in the North-East, with the 
result that commercial farm households’ incomes drop by nearly 5%, while smaller farm 
households see few, if any, losses. 
South Africa 
 
The aggregate results for South Africa indicate that the country’s own policy reforms have the 
biggest impact on welfare and income distribution. These conclusions are robust to alternative 
closure rules for the model, i.e. whether there is unemployed unskilled labour and whether 
income taxes offset lost tariff revenues from reduced tariffs. Global reforms are expected to 
result in a generalised expansion of economic activity with incomes rising across all 
household groups. There is a small shift in the allocation of resources towards minerals, 
manufacturing and service activities, which are more heavily concentrated in the inland 
provinces of South Africa, whereas the modest expansion in food and agricultural activities is 
primarily a consequence of the general economic expansion.
8 The key reason why domestic 
policy reforms have the biggest impact is that these reforms contribute to appreciable 
reductions in intermediate input costs and thereby increase the competitiveness of South 
Africa production. 
These economic reallocations result in a redistribution of welfare between both racial groups 
and provinces. Coastal provinces (Western and Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal) experience 
small welfare losses (about 0.5%) under all closure combinations, while inland provinces, 
notably North West and Mpumlanga, show relatively strong gains – over 2% – under all 
closure combinations (Figure 3).
9 Relatedly, White households lose slightly (about 0.6%), 
while African households gain, and there are only marginal impacts on Coloured and Asian 
households. The imposition of fiscal neutrality increases the welfare losses for White 
households (Figure  4). The implication of these changes is that reform has a slightly 
progressive impact on the distribution of income. 
                                                 
8.  The inland provinces are Gauteng, North West, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Free State. 
9.  Figures 3 and 4 show the effects of reform across households, according whether or not South Africa 
itself participates in reform, under different closure combinations. 
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Source: McDonald (2005b). 
The welfare implications of reform also differ with respect to other factors, such as residential 
area and education (Figure 4). This is consistent with the fact that household level impacts 
depend at least as much on changes in production structures, factor prices and incomes as they 
do on the prices of consumption commodities. It is notable that poorer less educated African 
households living in the homelands do relatively well, largely through increased demand for 
unskilled wage labour.  Although the detailed results vary appreciably within the averages for 
province and racial aggregates, they do reveal that if a household is a member of racial and 
province groups that both do well then that household tends to gain substantially; if a 
household is a member of racial and province groups that both do poorly then that household 
tends to lose significantly; and if a household is a member of racial and province groups only 
one of which does well then the benefits reflect a combination of the two effects. Hence one 
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consequence in South Africa of trade policy reforms will be an increase in the incentives for 
(internal) labour migration.
10
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Source: McDonald (2005b). 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
The distributional effects of global reforms are invariably larger than the aggregate efficiency 
gains, at least over the short to medium term. The reason is intuitive: policy reform is 
effectively a reversal of interventions which redistribute money from one group to another 
and, by distorting the allocation of resources, entail an efficiency loss which is smaller than 
the size of the policy transfer. 
However, the effects are still small, at no more than a few percentage points of current 
welfare, even for those households most affected by reform. This result is consistent with the 
                                                 
10.   For further details, see OECD (2006b). 
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findings of the Hertel and Winters project, and not surprising given that (a) a large share of 
world non-agricultural trade is already relatively liberalised, and (b) that trade accounts for a 
minor share of economic activity in each country, with all six countries having significant 
portions of society who operate on a semi-subsistence basis (Hertel and Winters, 2005b). 
In most cases, given aggregate welfare gains, the majority of households are expected to 
benefit (rural Mexico being the exception). But there are few clear patterns in terms of 
poverty or distributional impacts. In the three studies where the focus is on rural areas rather 
than the whole economy (China, India and Mexico) some poor households gain and some lose. 
Hence, it is impossible to reform, and equally to not reform, without imposing a cost on some 
of the poor. In the economy-wide studies (Brazil, Malawi and South Africa) there is a similar 
complexity of non-rural impacts. In some cases, such as Brazil, economy-wide impacts may 
fully offset the direct incidence of reforms. 
At the level of agricultural policy reform, one obvious generalisation is that the biggest 
immediate impacts tend to be on commercial producers. When domestic protection is low and 
prices received rise as a result of other countries’ reforms, commercial farm households gain 
the most. Similarly they lose most when confronted with the loss of domestic protection. This 
result holds in both absolute terms and relative to other types of household. 
The reasons that this result holds in relative, not just absolute, terms are threefold. In the first 
place non-commercial farm households tend to have more diversified income sources, with a 
greater share of income coming from non-farm activities. This tends to limit the impact of 
sector-specific reforms. Second, non-commercial farm households (notably subsistence 
households in developing countries) tend to have significant self-consumption of farm 
products, which dampens or even reverses the benefits of price increases. Indeed, many poor 
farm households in developing countries are net consumers of commodities they produce, 
which means they are likely to lose from higher prices. Third, non-commercial households are 
likely to incur higher transaction costs than their commercial counterparts. This can further 
dampen the beneficial effects of price increases, and can lead to factor market impacts (such 
as higher land rents) dominating. In many cases, therefore, it appears that reforms that benefit 
commercial producers are likely to have mixed effects within the overall category of 
non-commercial farm households. 
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The distributional effects of reform among agricultural wage earners and consumers are often 
important in developing countries, given relatively large numbers of agricultural labourers 
and the fact that the poorest households often spend a large share of their incomes on food 
(40% or more). The impacts of reform on agricultural employees depend fundamentally on 
the hiring decisions of commercial farm households. In many cases, farm workers are 
relatively poor, even compared with non-commercial households. A rise in wages, or 
expansion in employment, thus mitigates the rise in inequality from commercial farm 
households becoming richer. Moreover, wage increases may also benefit semi-subsistence 
households to the extent that they obtain income from off-farm work. 
In developing countries, food price changes can have large impacts on the real incomes of 
consumers. That said, consumers are less specialised in their consumption patterns than 
producers are specialised in their income sources, and can switch more quickly to cheaper 
foodstuffs than producers can adjust their supplies. Hence the effects of any particular price 
increase will be less acute. In the case of Brazil, the agro-food industry is sufficiently 
important that the losses to urban households from higher food prices are on balance 
outweighed by higher redistributed profits and labour income originating from increased 
agro-food exports. In this study, therefore, the income gains are spread across all groups, and 
while inequality among agricultural producers increases, poverty declines and there is little 
economy-wide impact on inequality. 
An important finding from the six studies is that the methodological approach determines the 
insights that are available. In the CGE studies (Brazil and South Africa) macro factors are 
critical in determining distributional impacts. Yet these factors are only partially accounted 
for in the other four studies. On the other hand, the farm household model based approach 
(adopted for Malawi and Mexico) shows how market failures can lead to a number of 
unexpected effects that are not anticipated in CGE or micro-simulation analyses. Thus, in the 
Malawi study, farm households that are net buyers of food may lose from a small price 
increase, but gain from a larger one that enables them to become net sellers. In the case of 
Mexico, poor farm households in some regions benefit from higher maize prices, but similar 
households in other regions lose as they are less integrated with output markets, yet pay 
higher land rents as the expansion in commercial output increases the demand for land. The 
chief limitation of micro-simulation, the third type of analysis (undertaken for China and 
India), is that behavioural responses are determined within GTAPEM and applied, in the same 
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manner, to all households. Yet these two studies calculate welfare changes for every surveyed 
household, and pick up subtleties that are overlooked in the other studies’ use of 
representative groups. For example, it is likely that some farm households in Brazil will lose 
from reform, even though each of the five groups gains on average. The implication is that the 
results of any model need to be treated with caution. 
The results of the models are comparative static, i.e. they show the effect of reforms once 
households and markets have had time to adjust. In excluding dynamics, such as investment 
and productivity linkages, and household movement between sectors, they ignore factors that 
are ultimately likely to govern the long-term impacts of reform on poor households. In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that the micro-simulation analyses (for China and India) and 
the farm household approaches (for Malawi and Mexico) both reveal how poorer households 
(in particular farmers) can have the greatest difficulty in adjusting. In other words, if poor 
households are adversely affected by reform, they will find it more difficult to do anything 
about it over the longer term. This result also supports a conclusion of Hertel and Winters – 
that complementary domestic policy reforms are needed in order for developing countries to 
reap the maximum benefit from global trade reforms. 
Given that it is impossible to fine tune trade reforms such that no households lose, a useful 
focus for Doha discussions would appear to be on facilitating adjustment where possible, and 
providing effective safety nets for poor households who cannot, or will take time, to adjust. 
This has more potential than exemptions from trade commitments and delayed 
implementation of reforms, both of which may increase poverty rather than reduce it. 
Applications such as these case studies can be helpful in identifying the pressure points of 
reform, the varying capacities of households for adjustment, and the need or otherwise for 
supporting policy measures. They also provide valuable information on the effects of changes 
in the policy mix. For example, if agricultural protection is to be significantly reduced, the 
adjustment stresses to farm households may be reduced significantly by ensuring that 
non-agricultural reforms proceed concurrently. More hopefully, if the distributional impacts 
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